Twelve Months After Kuala Lumpur: Sovereign Defence, the AOT's Unfinished Mandate and the Return of Cambodia's Displaced
One year after the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, the easing of fighting is welcome, but displaced Cambodian families still need safe, monitored return and the ASEAN Observer Team's mandate needs fuller delivery.
One year ago, on 26 October 2025, Cambodia and Thailand signed the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration. It was a meaningful diplomatic step toward easing border tensions and handling a long-running dispute by peaceful means. For Cambodia, its importance goes beyond the commitments Thailand made. It is also about defending territorial integrity and helping border communities return to ordinary life.
The first anniversary raises a basic question: has the peace process delivered the security and humanitarian relief it promised?
The Royal Government of Cambodia deserves credit for engaging in diplomacy, defending the country's territorial interests and using regional mechanisms to contain tensions. The creation of the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) was an important step toward monitoring and verifying the ceasefire. Its personnel work in a delicate setting, where impartial observation and clear communication can keep incidents from escalating.
Still, a peace agreement should be judged by how it is carried out, not just by how it was signed. An end to active fighting matters, but lasting peace also means restoring civilian livelihoods, addressing alleged violations and settling outstanding border questions peacefully.
A year on from Kuala Lumpur, the unfinished work is both territorial and humanitarian.
The Commitments: From Kuala Lumpur to Civilian Return
The 26 October 2025 Joint Declaration reaffirmed commitments to de-escalation, international law and peaceful dispute settlement. It set up the AOT framework and recognised existing bilateral bodies, including the General Border Committee (GBC) and the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC).
The Joint Statement of the Third Special GBC Meeting, signed on 27 December 2025, set out more detailed operational commitments. Paragraphs 1 and 2 cover the ceasefire and keeping existing troop deployments in place, without further movement toward the other side's positions. Paragraph 3 makes clear that these arrangements do not prejudice the international boundary or its demarcation.
The most significant provision is paragraph 4, under which both sides agree to let civilians living in affected border areas return at the earliest opportunity, without obstruction, and safely and with dignity, to their homes and livelihoods on their own side of the border.
Paragraph 12 recognises the AOT's role and calls for strengthening its verification function in consultation with the ASEAN Chair and the AOT itself.
These commitments provide a basis for pressing for concrete progress. However, they must be read according to their exact wording and the AOT's Terms of Reference. The AOT's role is to verify. It is not a body that decides sovereignty, and it does not hold enforcement powers that have not been explicitly granted.
The 2000 Memorandum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of the Land Boundary also remains relevant. Together with later agreements, it provides a framework for resolving boundary questions through established bilateral procedures. Neither a ceasefire line nor the temporary holding of military positions should, on its own, be treated as a final determination of sovereignty.
The goal must be to ensure that temporary security arrangements do not prejudice the boundary settlement, while making sure civilians are not left displaced indefinitely.
Ground Realities: Displacement and the Risk of Entrenched Disputes
The central humanitarian question is simple: can affected Cambodian families safely return to their homes, farm their land and resume normal life?
Cambodia has alleged that Thai military personnel have maintained positions in areas Cambodia claims, erected barriers or fortifications, and restricted civilian access. These allegations need independent verification of the exact locations, the applicable boundary arrangements and the conduct involved. They should not be treated automatically as established legal findings.
Restricted access has serious consequences. Families may lose harvests and income and be cut off from their property, while depending on temporary aid. These hardships need urgent attention, whether or not the underlying territorial dispute is ever fully resolved.
Where civilians are prevented from returning to areas on their own side, both parties should identify the obstacles and take practical steps to remove them. Where the boundary remains disputed, interim arrangements should be pursued through agreed mechanisms without prejudicing either side's legal position.
Physical installations and prolonged military presence can raise serious concerns if they contravene agreed arrangements or deepen the dispute. A fence, an observation post or a period of physical control does not automatically transfer sovereignty or establish lawful title. Its legal significance depends on the evidence, the location, the applicable agreements and the wider legal context.
The International Court of Justice's 1962 judgment in the Temple of Preah Vihear case and its 2013 interpretation judgment remain important authorities within their defined scope. They should not be presented as having settled every separate section of the Cambodia–Thailand boundary.
Humanitarian demining must also stay focused on protecting civilians. Both countries' obligations under the Ottawa Convention and their agreed coordination arrangements should guide operations. Clearance should protect civilians, involve proper technical coordination and avoid creating unnecessary obstacles to safe access.
The AOT: A Valuable Presence That Must Deliver Results
The AOT can improve communication, document incidents, support de-escalation and provide a more reliable basis for responding to developments on the ground. Its effectiveness depends on cooperation, access, operational clarity and the timely sharing of verified findings.
The public has a legitimate interest in knowing whether the agreed measures are being implemented. Operational confidentiality may be necessary to protect personnel and preserve diplomatic channels, but it should not block meaningful accountability. Equally, the lack of comprehensive public reporting does not, by itself, prove that the AOT has failed or that either party has obstructed its work.
A stronger approach would be regular compliance assessments that separate verified incidents from allegations, identify unresolved issues and record corrective measures. Public summaries should be issued where operational considerations allow, with sensitive information kept protected.
Where observers cannot inspect a relevant location, the reason should be recorded and alternative verification methods considered. Unresolved access disputes should be referred through agreed coordination mechanisms.
The AOT is not a supranational enforcement authority, and it should not replace the JBC or determine territorial sovereignty. Its value lies in credible verification, timely communication and preventing miscalculation. The mandate it has been given must be implemented effectively.
Peace cannot be measured by the silence of weapons alone. A ceasefire that reduces immediate military danger but leaves families unable to return, without a credible process for resolving their situation, remains incomplete.
Four Priorities for the Second Year
First, strengthen compliance reporting. Cambodia and Thailand should support regular assessments covering verified incidents, access restrictions, alleged fortifications and corrective action. Reports should distinguish established facts from unresolved allegations and provide enough transparency to build public confidence.
Second, establish monitored civilian-return arrangements. The parties should identify affected communities, document homes and farmland, and assess security conditions for return.