Trade Imbalances: Why Everyone Is Talking About Them
Trade imbalances are not inherently harmful, but when they grow too large and last too long, they fuel protests, crises and painful rearrangements of the global trading system. This piece examines why they matter and who ends up paying.
China will not overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy anytime soon, and perhaps never. The rest of us, however, have to get used to an international economic order that is becoming more fragmented and more prone to constant disruption. Any newspaper will show you as much.
Recent headlines describe how “reciprocal tariffs” undermined confidence, pushed up prices and weakened the WTO. To understand the subject better, I once spoke with Professor Kimberly Clausing of UCLA, an expert in tax law and policy.
In his 2025 book, economist Neil Shearing argues that we now live in The Fractured Age, a period marked by a harsh return of great power rivalry. “Fractured” may be the politest word for what has happened to the global trade system. Which countries will stay within the US-led bloc, and which will follow China? Most ordinary people hardly care, though I wonder whether the undecided nations might be persuaded by the “middle powers” idea that Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney put forward in his 2026 Davos speech.
Thinking through these scenarios could keep a lot of coffee shops busy. But we should not attempt the thought experiment that inspired Einstein’s “happiest thought,” the image of a man falling from a rooftop, which eventually led him to his General Theory of Relativity.
What does physics have to do with geoeconomics? In short, the laws of physics rest on mathematical proof and repeated observation, while our confidence in economics tends to fade as soon as we try to pin down the exact causes of a financial crisis.
Much like blind men describing an elephant from the part they touch, economists often describe the same problem in very different ways. Yet they all reach for the same evidence, and the numbers do not lie. Between 1991 and 2007, the peak years of globalisation, US spending on Chinese imports rose sevenfold, according to David Autor and his co-authors in The China Syndrome (American Economic Review, 2013). It is no surprise that American factory workers lost their jobs at home. As former US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer put it in No Trade Is Free (2023), trade always comes with a price.
China, the world’s second-largest economy, has run a trade surplus with the US since the late 1980s, and with most other major economies since the late 1990s. Is that necessarily bad? Not in itself. Trade imbalances, whether surpluses or deficits, are a normal part of economic exchange. A country may sell heavily to one partner while buying mainly from others. Trade liberalisation works like a magic spell only as long as the wand is waved fairly.
Once imbalances become large and persist for years, anger among the countries running deficits is almost inevitable. Rising living costs and protests across European cities are a constant reminder of this.
When international politics is reduced to a ledger of gains and losses, the language of winners and losers spreads quickly (Anthea Roberts and Nicolas Lamp, Six Faces of Globalization, 2021). Trading partners who feel shortchanged will not stay quiet. Given the scale of these imbalances, bilateral and multilateral relationships, and with them the wider global trading system, eventually have to be rearranged. Any adjustment is costly, no matter who ends up paying the most.
A history of painful adjustments
Such adjustments have often arrived in the form of crises, as Michael Pettis explains in his 2026 analysis. His account of past episodes is a useful reminder:
- The Great Depression (1930s): US output was high, but domestic consumption was weak because wages were low. Americans borrowed heavily to keep consuming and to fund asset bubbles. When protectionism rose as the adjustment, the largest exporter of the time suffered most as global trade collapsed.
- Latin America (1970s): The oil shock created huge sums of “petrodollars” in the oil-exporting Middle East. That money flowed into Latin America, pushing public and private borrowing to dangerous levels and setting up another crisis.
- Japan and Germany (1980s): Productivity rose sharply in both countries, but wages barely moved. Their competitiveness produced large surpluses, and the excess savings were channelled into property bubbles and poor investments, with predictable results.
- Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98): Much like Latin America, foreign capital poured in and was borrowed to finance risky projects and asset bubbles. When capital fled, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines were hit hard.
- Global Financial Crisis (2008): Loose regulation and low interest rates fed excessive debt, particularly in subprime mortgages.
Managing and investing vast amounts of capital is never easy. Pettis covers these crises and others in his article “A Great Rebalancing Is Coming: Who Will Bear the Costs of a Global Trade Adjustment?”, published in Foreign Affairs in August 2026.
Keeping that history in mind, the uncomfortable truth is that we cannot ignore the looming risks, even as protectionist measures become common again. Talk of trade wars keeps growing louder, but my cappuccino sits untouched on the table, too cold to drink.
Follow the coffee
To see how a trade war works, imagine the journey of a coffee bean before it reaches a café. Unlike the man in Einstein’s thought experiment, the beans move along a path that is far less erratic.
Where is the tax highest? In the farming country where the beans are grown? At the border when they enter the importing country? Or mostly at the points where they undergo further processing?
The rules of origin make things even murkier. The beans pass through harvesting, milling, shipping, roasting or blending, and finally retail packaging, and the idea of “substantial transformation” is vague. For customs purposes, green Colombian beans roasted in the US can count as American-origin, since roasting counts as a substantial transformation. Yet consumer protection rules often lead to labels such as “Made in the USA from Colombian beans.” If a simple product like coffee is this complicated, imagine how tangled the trade in sophisticated machinery must be. Calculating imbalances from the total value of imports and exports produces neat numbers that are easy to use in political speeches.
Do trade imbalances really capture the whole picture at every stage? It is far more complicated than that. At best, they are an imperfect approximation. So what is all the fuss about?
Who really pays?
In a recent public lecture on trade imbalances, I briefly mentioned the work of Keynes and Bown, whose book How to Win a Trade War (2026) offers one striking conclusion: “In a trade war, companies are terrible soldiers.” Trade wars hurt different market players in very different ways.
Multinational companies with business units spread across several continents are likely to face the biggest headaches. In a capitalist system where corporations pour heavy money into political campaigns, policymakers can expect strong pressure to act as soon as trade war headlines make the news.