Thailand's Approach to Holding Cambodian Territory: A Growing Concern
The Cambodia–Thailand border dispute raises questions of sovereignty, international law and the stalled demarcation of their shared boundary. Critics argue that holding contested ground while joint surveys remain on hold risks undermining Cambodia's territorial rights.
The border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand is about more than where a line on a map should run. It raises basic questions of national sovereignty, respect for international law, the stability of boundaries set by earlier agreements, and the duty of neighbouring states to settle territorial disagreements peacefully and by mutual consent.
At the centre of the current tensions is a serious worry. If one side keeps physical control of disputed land while the technical demarcation of the border stays stalled, the situation on the ground could gradually change in ways that weaken Cambodia's territorial rights.
Cambodia's position has been consistent. It holds that the international boundary with Thailand should be fixed on the basis of the relevant historical treaties, recognised legal principles, documents both sides have acknowledged, and bilateral agreements. Thailand, in this view, should respect those foundations rather than take unilateral steps that complicate a peaceful resolution.
Maps Cannot Stand in for Agreed Boundaries
A central point of contention is the use of maps. A state cannot acquire sovereignty over another state's territory simply by drawing its own map, publishing it, or relying on it for administrative or military purposes.
International boundaries have to be assessed through the treaties, conventions, historical records, agreed boundary documents and applicable principles of international law that govern them. In the Cambodia–Thailand case, the Franco-Siamese Conventions of 1904, the Treaty of 1907, and the maps and papers produced by the historical boundary commissions form the key reference points. The 2000 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two countries also provides a framework for joint surveys and demarcation along the land border.
For these reasons, Thailand cannot legitimately replace the boundary framework set out in historical agreements and mutually recognised legal instruments with its own cartographic reading. Any disagreement over maps should be handled through evidence-based technical discussion and established legal procedures, not through unilateral declarations or military control.
Maps should help define and clarify boundaries under international law. They should not become tools for enlarging territorial claims at a neighbour's expense.
Delays to the JBC Are Blocking a Peaceful Settlement
The Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) is the main bilateral body that Cambodia and Thailand set up to survey and demarcate their shared land border. Under the 2000 MoU, both governments are bound to cooperate in locating boundary markers, carrying out joint technical surveys, and following agreed procedures.
In practice, the mechanism has been held back again and again. Cambodia has repeatedly asked for JBC meetings to resume and for Joint Survey Teams (JSTs) to be deployed to disputed areas. On February 1, 2026, the Cambodian government publicly confirmed that it had once more proposed deploying joint survey teams and holding technical meetings. At the same time, it objected to Thai military activities that it said were attempting to change the situation in border areas.
The key question is why technical demarcation keeps running into obstacles when both governments have already agreed that the JBC should resume its work.
Thailand has previously pointed to internal administrative procedures, the formation of its government, and the need to appoint its JBC representatives as reasons for postponing meetings. Those explanations have led many to doubt whether Thailand is truly willing to give technical cooperation priority. The International Crisis Group reported in October 2026 that Bangkok had declined to restart the JBC's technical work, even though the body is central to resolving the land-border dispute.
It is fair to note that Thailand named a new head of its JBC delegation in July 2026. Still, naming representatives is only a first step. The real measure of political commitment is whether those officials are ready to sit down with their Cambodian counterparts and carry out actual fieldwork.
Thailand cannot keep stressing bilateral negotiations while the practical mechanism meant to carry them out remains inactive.
Holding Ground While Avoiding Joint Verification
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the situation is the gap between what is said in diplomatic channels and what is happening on the ground.
Cambodia has repeatedly protested against the presence and actions of Thai military forces in areas it regards as its sovereign territory. Cambodian authorities have reported damage to civilian property, limits on the return of Cambodian residents, and activities that could alter the physical landscape of border areas.
The International Crisis Group's October 2026 report described Thai forces as holding positions in contested areas, and in territory it identified as indisputably Cambodian. It also noted Thailand's argument that the December 2025 ceasefire obliged both sides to keep their existing troop deployments.
That raises a basic question of international law and of good-faith implementation of bilateral agreements: can a ceasefire meant to halt armed confrontation be used to justify holding territory whose sovereignty is still disputed?
A ceasefire is meant to stop the violence and create conditions for peaceful talks. It should not be read as a territorial settlement, nor as recognition of sovereignty over land that another state claims.
If physical control is kept in place while joint demarcation is put off, temporary military positions could slowly harden into a permanent reality on the ground. That would erode trust in bilateral agreements and make a lasting peaceful settlement far harder to reach.
Cambodia therefore has a legitimate basis for insisting that any activity affecting the border environment be handled in line with the 2000 MoU and related agreements.
If Thailand Is Confident, Why Resist Joint Verification?
A basic principle of peaceful dispute settlement is that both parties must be prepared to have their claims examined objectively.
If Thailand truly believes the areas it currently controls belong to it, there is little reason to resist deploying joint technical teams. A confident government would show it by letting Cambodian and Thai experts survey the land, examine historical boundary records, check existing markers, and compare the relevant maps.
Cambodia is not asking Thailand to give up its claims without scrutiny. It is asking for the agreed technical process to be carried out.
Joint verification would clarify facts on the ground, reduce misunderstandings, and pinpoint the exact areas where disagreement remains. Both countries should make sure the process is transparent, professional, and free of military pressure.
Above all, neither side should alter the physical conditions of disputed areas while the technical process is still unfinished.
Thailand should therefore show its commitment to peaceful relations through concrete steps, not diplomatic statements alone. If its territorial claims rest on convincing legal and historical evidence, the JBC process is the proper place to demonstrate it.