One Year On From the Kuala Lumpur Accord: Sovereignty, the AOT's Unfinished Work, and Civilians' Right to Return
One year after the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, Cambodia's border peace process has calmed the fighting but has not yet restored normal life for displaced families. This piece examines the commitments made, the role of the ASEAN Observer Team, and what must happen next.
One year ago, on October 26, 2025, Cambodia and Thailand signed the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration. It was a meaningful diplomatic step toward easing border tensions and handling a long-running dispute through peaceful means. For Cambodia, the value of the declaration is not only the commitments Thailand made. It also lies in protecting the country's territorial integrity and helping families in border communities get their normal lives back.
The first anniversary invites a basic question: has the peace process delivered the security and humanitarian relief it promised?
The Royal Government of Cambodia deserves credit for pursuing diplomacy, defending the country's territorial interests, and using regional mechanisms to contain tensions. The ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) was an important step toward monitoring and verifying the ceasefire. Its personnel work in a delicate setting, where impartial observation and clear communication can keep incidents from spiralling.
Still, a peace agreement should be judged by how it is carried out, not just by the fact that it was signed. The lack of sustained fighting matters, but lasting peace also depends on civilians being able to rebuild their livelihoods, on alleged violations being addressed, and on the border questions being resolved through peaceful means.
A year after Kuala Lumpur, the unfinished business is both territorial and humanitarian.
The Commitments: From Kuala Lumpur to Civilian Return
The October 2025 Joint Declaration reaffirmed commitments to de-escalation, respect for international law, and peaceful resolution of disputes. It set up the AOT framework and acknowledged existing bilateral mechanisms, including the General Border Committee (GBC) and the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC).
The Joint Statement from the Third Special GBC Meeting, signed on December 27, 2025, went further by setting out more detailed operational commitments. Paragraphs 1 and 2 cover the ceasefire and the requirement that troops stay where they are, without moving closer to the other side's positions. Paragraph 3 states that these arrangements do not affect the international boundary or its demarcation.
The most significant provision is paragraph 4. Under it, both parties commit to letting civilians living in affected border areas return as soon as possible, without obstruction, and to their homes and livelihoods on their own side of the border, in safety and with dignity.
Paragraph 12 acknowledges the AOT's role and calls for strengthening its verification function, in consultation with the ASEAN Chair and the AOT itself.
These commitments give both sides a solid basis for pressing for concrete progress. They must, however, be read according to their exact wording and the AOT's Terms of Reference. The AOT's job is to verify. It is not a court that can decide sovereignty, and it does not hold enforcement powers that were never expressly granted.
The 2000 Memorandum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of the Land Boundary also remains relevant. Together with later agreements, it offers a framework for dealing with boundary questions through established bilateral procedures. A ceasefire line, or the temporary maintenance of military positions, should not on its own be treated as a final ruling on sovereignty.
The goal must be to ensure that temporary security arrangements do not prejudge the boundary settlement, while also making sure civilians are not left displaced indefinitely.
Ground Realities: Displacement and the Risk of Entrenched Disputes
The central humanitarian question is simple: can affected Cambodian families return safely to their homes, farm their land, and resume their normal lives?
Cambodia has alleged that Thai military personnel have kept positions in areas Cambodia claims, put up barriers or fortifications, and restricted civilian access. These allegations need independent verification of the exact locations, the boundary arrangements that apply, and the conduct in question. Until then, they should not automatically be treated as established legal findings.
Restricted access can have serious consequences. Families may lose harvests, income, and access to their property, and they may end up relying on temporary aid. These hardships call for urgent attention, whether or not the underlying territorial dispute has been settled.
Where civilians cannot return to areas on their own side, both parties should identify the obstacles and take practical steps to remove them. Where the boundary is still disputed, interim arrangements should be worked out through agreed mechanisms, without harming either side's legal position.
Physical installations and a long military presence can raise serious concerns, particularly if they breach agreed arrangements or deepen the dispute. A fence, an observation post, or a period of physical control does not by itself transfer sovereignty or create lawful title. Its legal weight depends on the evidence, its location, the applicable agreements, and the wider legal context.
The International Court of Justice's 1962 judgment in the Temple of Preah Vihear case, and its 2013 interpretation judgment, remain important authorities within their defined territorial and legal scope. They should not be portrayed as having resolved every separate section of the Cambodia-Thailand boundary.
Humanitarian demining must also stay focused on protecting civilians. Both countries' obligations under the Ottawa Convention, along with their agreed coordination arrangements, should guide the work. Mine clearance should protect civilians, involve proper technical coordination, and avoid creating needless barriers to safe access.
The AOT: A Valuable Presence That Must Deliver Results
The AOT can improve communication, document incidents, support de-escalation, and give a more dependable basis for responding to events on the ground. Its effectiveness depends on cooperation, access, clear operational procedures, and the timely sharing of verified findings.
The public has a legitimate interest in knowing whether the agreed measures are being implemented. Operational confidentiality may be needed to protect personnel and keep diplomatic channels open, but it should not block meaningful accountability. At the same time, the absence of comprehensive public reporting does not, on its own, prove that the AOT has failed or that either party has obstructed its work.
A stronger approach would include regular compliance assessments that separate verified incidents from allegations, list unresolved issues, and record the corrective steps taken. Public summaries should be released wherever operational considerations allow, with sensitive information kept protected.
When observers cannot inspect a relevant location, the reason should be recorded and alternative verification methods considered. Unresolved access disputes should be referred to the agreed coordination mechanisms.
The AOT is not a supranational enforcement body, and it should not take the place of the JBC or decide territorial sovereignty. Its value lies in credible verification, timely communication, and preventing miscalculation. The mandate it has been given must be carried out effectively.
Peace cannot be measured by silence on the battlefield alone. A ceasefire that lowers the immediate military danger, but leaves families unable to return and offers no credible process for resolving their situation, is still incomplete.
Four Priorities for the Second Year
First, strengthen compliance reporting. Cambodia and Thailand should back regular assessments that cover verified incidents, access restrictions, alleged fortifications, and corrective action. Reports should distinguish established facts from unresolved allegations and offer enough transparency to build public confidence.
Second, set up monitored civilian-return arrangements. The parties should identify affected communities and document their homes and farmland, as a first step toward a safe and orderly return.