One Year After the Kuala Lumpur Accord: Sovereign Defence, the AOT's Unfinished Mandate and the Right of Return
One year after the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, Cambodia and Thailand's peace process is judged less by the signed text than by whether displaced families can safely go home. This analysis examines the agreed commitments, the AOT's role and the priorities for the second year.
One year ago, on 26 October 2025, Cambodia and Thailand signed the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration. It was an important diplomatic step to ease border tensions and settle a long-running dispute by peaceful means. For Cambodia, the agreement matters less for the promises Thailand made than for what it can do to protect its territory and help border communities return to normal life.
As the first anniversary arrives, the key question is whether the peace process has delivered the security and humanitarian relief it promised.
The Royal Government of Cambodia deserves credit for engaging in diplomacy, defending the country's territorial interests and using regional channels to keep tensions in check. The ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) was an important step toward monitoring and verifying the ceasefire. Its members work in a delicate setting, where impartial observation and clear communication can stop incidents from spiralling.
Still, a peace agreement should be judged by how it is carried out, not by the fact that it was signed. Stopping the fighting matters, but lasting peace also means restoring civilian livelihoods, looking into alleged violations and settling outstanding border questions by peaceful means.
A year on from Kuala Lumpur, the unfinished work is both territorial and humanitarian.
The Commitments: From Kuala Lumpur to Civilian Return
The 26 October 2025 declaration reaffirmed commitments to de-escalation, international law and peaceful resolution of disputes. It set up the AOT framework and acknowledged existing bilateral bodies, including the General Border Committee (GBC) and the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC).
The joint statement from the Third Special GBC Meeting, signed on 27 December 2025, added more detailed operational commitments. Paragraphs 1 and 2 cover the ceasefire and keeping current troop deployments in place without moving further toward the other side's positions. Paragraph 3 states that these arrangements do not prejudice the international boundary or its demarcation.
The most significant provision is paragraph 4, in which both sides agree to let civilians living in affected border areas return as early as possible, without obstruction, and safely and with dignity, to their homes and livelihoods on their own side of the line.
Paragraph 12 acknowledges the AOT's role and calls for strengthening its verification function, in consultation with the ASEAN Chair and the AOT itself.
These commitments give a sound basis for pressing for concrete progress. But they must be read according to their precise wording and the AOT's Terms of Reference. The AOT's job is to verify, not to rule on sovereignty, and it holds no enforcement powers that have not been expressly granted.
The 2000 Memorandum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of Land Boundary also remains relevant. Together with later agreements, it sets out a route for resolving boundary questions through established bilateral procedures. A ceasefire line, or the temporary holding of military positions, should not by itself be read as a final decision on sovereignty.
The aim should be to stop temporary security arrangements from undermining the boundary settlement, while making sure civilians are not left displaced indefinitely.
Ground Realities: Displacement and the Risk of Entrenched Disputes
The central humanitarian question is simple: can affected Cambodian families return safely to their homes, farm their land and get back to normal life?
Cambodia has claimed that Thai military personnel have kept positions in areas Cambodia considers its own, put up barriers or fortifications, and limited civilian access. Such claims need independent checks on the exact locations, the boundary arrangements that apply and the conduct involved. They should not be treated as established legal findings in the meantime.
Restricted access can cause real harm. Families may lose harvests and income, and lose the use of their property, while depending on temporary aid. These hardships need urgent attention whether or not the underlying territorial dispute is ever resolved.
Where civilians are kept from returning to areas on their own side, the parties should identify the obstacles and take practical steps to remove them. Where the boundary is still contested, interim arrangements should be pursued through agreed mechanisms, without harming either side's legal position.
Physical structures and prolonged military presence raise serious concerns if they break agreed arrangements or make the dispute worse. A fence, an observation post or a period of physical control does not automatically transfer sovereignty or create legal title. Its legal weight depends on the evidence, its location, the applicable agreements and the wider legal context.
The International Court of Justice's 1962 judgment in the Temple of Preah Vihear case, and its 2013 interpretation judgment, remain major authorities within their defined scope. They should not be portrayed as having resolved every section of the Cambodia-Thailand boundary.
Humanitarian demining must also stay focused on protecting civilians. Obligations under the Ottawa Convention and the parties' agreed coordination arrangements should guide the work. Clearance should protect civilians, involve proper technical coordination and avoid creating needless barriers to safe access.
The AOT: A Valuable Presence That Must Deliver Results
The AOT can improve communication, record incidents, support de-escalation and provide a more reliable basis for responding to events on the ground. How well it works depends on cooperation, access, clear operational roles and timely sharing of verified findings.
The public has a legitimate interest in knowing whether the agreed measures are being carried out. Operational confidentiality may be needed to protect personnel and keep diplomatic channels open, but it should not block meaningful accountability. At the same time, the lack of full public reporting does not, on its own, prove that the AOT has failed or that either party is obstructing its work.
A stronger approach would include regular compliance assessments that separate verified incidents from allegations, flag unresolved issues and record corrective steps. Public summaries should be released wherever operational considerations allow, with sensitive material kept protected.
Where observers cannot inspect a relevant site, the reason should be recorded and alternative verification methods considered. Unresolved access disputes should be referred to the agreed coordination mechanisms.
The AOT is not a supranational enforcement body, and it should not replace the JBC or decide territorial sovereignty. Its value lies in credible verification, timely communication and preventing miscalculation. The mandate it has been given must be carried out effectively.
Peace cannot be measured by the silence of weapons alone. A ceasefire that lowers immediate military danger but leaves families unable to return, with no credible process to resolve their situation, is still incomplete.
Four Priorities for the Second Year
First, strengthen compliance reporting. Cambodia and Thailand should back regular assessments covering verified incidents, access restrictions, alleged fortifications and corrective action. Reports should distinguish established facts from unresolved allegations and be transparent enough to build public confidence.
Second, set up monitored civilian-return arrangements. The parties should identify affected communities, record homes and farmland, and assess security conditions.