Ceasefire Without Settlement: Alleged Breaches of the Kuala Lumpur Accord and the Fallacy of Fortified Borders
A year after the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, the real test is whether Cambodia and Thailand are implementing their peace commitments. Reported displacement and alleged fortifications in border areas show why verification and a lawful boundary process matter.
One year after the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, the key question is no longer whether Cambodia and Thailand have formally committed to peace, but whether those pledges are being carried out in practice. A halt to fighting does not settle a border dispute, and warm diplomatic language does not guarantee that displaced families can return home safely.
For Cambodia, the continued displacement of border residents and claims of military construction in contested zones raise serious doubts about what the peace process means in reality. Such concerns deserve close examination. Allegations, however, should not be treated as proven facts simply because they have been made. The real point is that agreements between states must be judged by how well they are honoured.
The aim should not be to stoke nationalist feeling or prejudge territorial claims. It should be to establish what is actually happening, uphold the agreements, protect civilians, and make sure neither side treats a temporary military advantage as a replacement for a lawful, negotiated settlement.
The Commitments Versus the Situation on the Ground
The Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, signed on 26 October 2025, reaffirmed both governments' pledges to settle disputes peacefully, respect international law and agreed boundaries, and put agreed de-escalation steps into effect. It also acknowledged the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) and existing bilateral channels for handling border issues.
The Joint Statement of the Third Special General Border Committee (GBC), signed on 27 December 2025, set out more concrete obligations. Both sides agreed to keep troop deployments where they stood without further movement, to restart surveying and demarcation through the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC), and to allow displaced civilians to return safely, without obstruction and with their dignity intact. They also committed to avoiding provocative acts and to refraining from building or expanding military infrastructure or fortifications beyond their own territory.
These provisions carry weight because peace means more than an absence of active fighting. It also demands restraint, predictability, adherence to agreed procedures, and practical steps that allow civilian life to return to normal.
The central legal question, then, is whether conduct reported since the ceasefire matches the commitments both governments made. Answering it requires evidence and reference to the relevant agreements, not rhetoric alone.
Displacement and Ongoing Allegations
The humanitarian picture remains deeply troubling.
On 17 September 2026, Cambodia's Ministry of National Defence said that 3,318 families, totalling 13,259 people, in Banteay Meanchey province still could not return home. The ministry blamed extensive damage from bombing, airstrikes and artillery fire, as well as what it described as occupation by Thai forces.
On 7 October 2026, Cambodian authorities reported that 1,114 civilians from 357 families in the An Ses area of Preah Vihear province were also unable to go back. The ministry alleged that Thai military personnel had placed shipping containers, strung barbed wire, dug trenches and built fortifications, and that houses, infrastructure and civilian property had been damaged.
These are grave claims made by Cambodian authorities, and their origin should remain clear. The reports do not, on their own, amount to an independent finding on each incident, its exact location or its legal status. Even so, the scale of continuing displacement calls for a serious response and credible verification.
Behind every number are families whose homes, livelihoods, schooling and sense of safety have been disrupted. Their right to return should not be treated as a secondary issue to be addressed once diplomatic relations improve. Safe and voluntary return is itself a key test of whether peace is taking hold.
Both governments should allow impartial verification, protect civilians and publish reliable information about affected areas. Where breaches are confirmed, the party responsible should take appropriate corrective action.
Military Infrastructure Cannot Substitute for Law
The reports of containers, trenches, barbed wire and fortifications raise a basic point: physical control alone does not establish lawful title to territory.
A military position may show effective presence on the ground, but it does not automatically fix the international boundary or settle competing legal claims. Territorial questions must be assessed under the applicable treaties, boundary instruments, maps, archival records, relevant historical evidence and principles of international law.
Cambodia and Thailand already have a framework for these questions, including the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of Land Boundary, which provides for joint technical work and peaceful consultation. The December 2025 GBC Joint Statement also directs the two countries to resume survey and demarcation through the JBC at the earliest opportunity.
At the same time, not every physical change on the ground is necessarily a legal violation. The location of the activity, the legal status of the area, the governing agreement and the available evidence all matter.
Still, where military infrastructure is built or reinforced in the other state's territory, or in ways that contradict agreed restraint, the issue cannot be brushed aside simply because the structures now exist. Neither the passage of time nor additional fortifications should be allowed to stand in for a lawful boundary settlement. Territorial claims must be resolved through law and agreed procedures, not through unilateral faits accomplis.
The JBC as a Practical Test of Progress
Restarting the JBC is among the most concrete steps both governments can take. It is not a symbolic concession by either side. It is a bilateral mechanism designed to carry out the technical work needed to clarify and demarcate the boundary.
Thailand has raised concerns about security conditions for JBC fieldwork, including landmine risks and threats in border areas. These deserve serious attention. Survey teams must be able to work safely, and humanitarian demining needs to be coordinated with technical boundary work.
Security worries, however, should lead to practical arrangements rather than open-ended delay. The two sides could identify priority areas, agree on safety protocols, coordinate demining where necessary and set a transparent timetable for technical work.
The JBC will not resolve every question of sovereignty, military conduct or civilian return on its own. Its value lies in reducing uncertainty and providing a structured route for boundary questions. A jointly surveyed and demarcated boundary would also give both countries a firmer reference point for assessing later allegations of incursion.
Progress should therefore be judged by tangible results: meetings held, technical work restarted, priority areas agreed and verifiable steps taken to ease tensions. Neither government should use the JBC as a public-relations tool while the practical work remains stalled.