Bilateral Talk in Public, Unilateral Facts on the Border
Thailand publicly calls for bilateral talks with Cambodia, but its handling of the border and its silence on Cambodian proposals raise doubts about its commitment. The displaced families waiting to go home show what is at stake.
Thailand's leaders keep urging Cambodia to settle their border dispute through direct bilateral talks rather than raising it at international forums. On November 15, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul restated that Thailand did not want to bring territorial and humanitarian disagreements before countries that are not part of the conflict. Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow has made similar arguments and has criticised Cambodia for drawing international attention to the border situation.
On the surface, that position sounds sensible. Neighbours should pursue peace through dialogue, existing mechanisms and mutual respect, and Cambodia does not disagree with that in principle. The real problem is the widening gap between Thailand's public championing of bilateralism and how it actually behaves.
Bilateralism should be judged by substance, not by how often it is invoked before international audiences. The test is whether both sides genuinely take part, respond to formal proposals, keep their commitments and avoid steps that undermine the talks. The real question, then, is not whether Cambodia supports bilateral dialogue, but whether Thailand is willing to act on what it preaches.
A record of unanswered requests
Cambodia's diplomatic record is a useful starting point. On November 10, government spokesperson Pen Bona said Phnom Penh had sent Thailand 12 diplomatic notes asking for the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) to resume meetings after the ceasefire of December 27, 2025. According to him, Thailand has not responded to any of them.
These were not vague offers to talk. The notes contained concrete proposals: convening a special JBC meeting, sending Joint Survey Teams back into the field to resume fieldwork, and continuing technical discussions on boundary demarcation.
Cambodia also sought to carry out steps agreed at the October 2025 JBC meeting, including replacing 15 boundary pillars whose locations had already been agreed. Thailand pointed to domestic administrative procedures and the need to finish appointing its JBC representatives. Those factors may explain some delays, but they cannot keep a bilateral mechanism frozen indefinitely.
The General Border Committee (GBC) offers another example. Cambodia took part in the talks that led to the third special GBC meeting on December 27, 2025, which produced a joint statement setting out the ceasefire and practical steps to de-escalate tensions.
It would be inaccurate to say Thailand has never engaged in bilateral negotiations. The two countries have held meetings and signed agreements. The more important question is whether those agreements are being implemented in good faith. A meeting means little if its commitments go unfulfilled, and a signed document cannot take the place of action.
Bilateralism does not require silence abroad
Thailand's position also raises a broader question: does pursuing bilateral talks oblige Cambodia to stop raising humanitarian and territorial concerns internationally?
There is no inherent contradiction. Cambodia can keep working with Thailand through the JBC, the GBC and other established channels while also briefing ASEAN, the United Nations and international partners. Engaging the international community does not amount to rejecting bilateral dialogue. It can increase transparency, encourage compliance with agreements and prevent a bilateral dispute from growing into a wider regional problem.
Seeking international attention is also different from asking outside countries to decide sovereignty. Cambodia's presence in international forums does not mean handing responsibility for the dispute away from bilateral mechanisms.
Thailand is entitled to defend its diplomatic position, and Cambodia is equally entitled to explain what an unresolved border means in practice, especially while thousands of civilians cannot return home. If Thailand truly believes bilateral mechanisms are the right path, the most constructive response would be to make them work again, rather than repeatedly criticising Cambodia for pointing out that they have stalled.
Security or control of territory?
The most revealing test of Thailand's commitment to bilateralism is not found in its diplomatic statements, but on the border itself.
Thailand describes its troop deployments and physical barriers as necessary security measures, and every sovereign state has the right and duty to protect its territory and citizens. The real question is whether the scale, location, duration and nature of Thailand's military and civilian activity in disputed areas can reasonably be explained as purely defensive.
Cambodia has repeatedly reported troop deployments, shipping containers, barbed and razor-wire fencing, trenches, bunkers, checkpoints and other structures in areas it considers its own territory. It has also reported the destruction of civilian homes and property, and restrictions that prevent residents from returning to their communities.
The concern is not simply the presence of Thai soldiers. It is the combined effect of these measures: installing barriers, building fortifications, limiting civilian access and maintaining control over places whose boundaries are still disputed.
Taken together, these developments point to an effort to establish effective physical control over land Cambodia claims, rather than merely maintaining a defensive posture. This risks creating a fait accompli, with physical control established first while sovereignty and final demarcation remain unresolved. It also risks changing conditions in disputed areas before the agreed bilateral mechanisms have finished their work.
Thailand maintains that its measures are located within territory it regards as sovereign, and that position must be acknowledged. But a unilateral reading of territory cannot replace joint demarcation, and military control cannot establish lawful sovereignty.
The December 27 GBC joint statement provides a clear benchmark. Both governments agreed to keep their existing troop deployments, avoid provocative actions, and refrain from building or expanding military infrastructure or fortifications on their own side. They also committed to resuming JBC survey and demarcation work as soon as possible.
Those commitments should be honoured in both letter and spirit. Any alleged violations should be examined through agreed verification mechanisms, including the ASEAN Observer Team.
A military presence does not confer territorial title. Razor wire cannot substitute for boundary demarcation, and the passage of time alone cannot turn a disputed position into an internationally recognised border.
Peace must include the right to go home
Behind the diplomatic exchanges are families whose lives remain on hold. According to Pen Bona on November 10, more than 20,000 displaced Cambodians were still unable to return home. A separate Interior Ministry update on November 4 put the wider remaining displacement figure at roughly 24,000 people.
These totals describe displacement more broadly, and they make clear that the human cost of the standoff extends well beyond the diplomatic arena.