Bilateral Talk in Public, Unilateral Control on the Ground
Thailand calls for bilateral negotiations with Cambodia, but its unanswered diplomatic requests and tightened control along the border raise doubts about its commitment to that approach.
Thailand's leaders have repeatedly urged Cambodia to settle their border dispute through direct talks rather than taking it to international forums. On November 15, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said Thailand did not want to bring territorial and humanitarian questions before countries that are not party to the conflict. Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow has made similar arguments and has criticised Cambodia's efforts to draw international attention to the situation.
On the surface, that stance sounds sensible. Neighbours should pursue peaceful solutions through dialogue, existing mechanisms and mutual respect, and Cambodia does not fundamentally disagree. The real problem is the widening gap between Thailand's public support for bilateral talks and how it actually behaves.
A government's commitment to bilateralism should not be judged by how often it invokes the idea abroad. The better test is whether both sides genuinely take part, respond to formal proposals, keep their promises and avoid steps that undermine the talks.
A long list of unanswered requests
Cambodia's record is a useful starting point. On November 10, government spokesperson Pen Bona said Phnom Penh had sent Thailand 12 diplomatic notes asking to restart Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) meetings after the ceasefire of December 27, 2025. According to him, Thailand has not responded.
These were not vague offers to talk. The notes contained concrete proposals, including a special JBC meeting, the return of Joint Survey Teams to fieldwork, and continued technical work on boundary demarcation.
Cambodia also sought to carry out steps agreed at the October 2025 JBC meeting, such as replacing 15 boundary pillars at locations already agreed upon. Thailand pointed to domestic administrative procedures and the need to finish appointing its JBC representatives. Those factors may explain some of the delays, but they cannot justify leaving a bilateral mechanism idle indefinitely.
The General Border Committee (GBC) offers another example. Cambodia took part in the talks that led to the third special GBC meeting on December 27, 2025, which produced a joint statement setting out the ceasefire and practical steps to ease tensions.
It would be inaccurate to say Thailand has never negotiated. The two countries have held meetings and signed agreements. What matters more is whether those agreements are carried out in good faith. A meeting has little value if its outcomes are never delivered, and a signed document cannot replace action.
Bilateral talks do not require silence abroad
Thailand's position also raises a broader question: does pursuing bilateral talks mean Cambodia must stay quiet about its humanitarian and territorial concerns in international settings?
There is no inherent contradiction. Cambodia can keep working through the JBC, the GBC and other established channels while raising its concerns with ASEAN, the United Nations and partner countries.
Engaging internationally does not amount to rejecting bilateralism. It can bring transparency, encourage compliance with agreements and help keep a bilateral disagreement from becoming a wider regional problem.
Seeking international attention is also different from asking outside countries to decide sovereignty. Taking a case to international forums does not transfer responsibility for resolving the dispute away from bilateral mechanisms.
Thailand is entitled to defend its diplomatic position, and Cambodia is equally entitled to explain the consequences of an unresolved border, especially while thousands of civilians cannot return home. If Thailand truly believes bilateral mechanisms are the right path, the most constructive step is to make them work again, rather than criticising Cambodia for discussing how long they have been inactive.
Security measures or consolidating control?
The most telling test of Thailand's commitment is not found in official statements but along the border itself.
Thailand describes its military deployments and physical barriers as necessary for security, and every state has the right and duty to protect its territory and people. The real question is whether the scale, location, duration and character of Thai military and civilian activity in disputed areas can reasonably be explained as purely defensive.
Cambodia has reported troop deployments, shipping containers, barbed and razor wire fencing, trenches, bunkers, checkpoints and other structures in areas it regards as Cambodian territory. It has also reported the destruction of civilian homes and property, and restrictions that keep residents from returning to their communities.
The concern is less about the mere presence of Thai soldiers than about the combined effect of these actions: erecting barriers, building fortifications, limiting civilian access and holding positions in places whose boundaries are still in dispute.
Taken together, these developments suggest an effort to establish effective physical control over territory that Cambodia claims, rather than simply maintaining a defensive posture.
This creates a fait accompli. Control is established first, while sovereignty and final demarcation remain unresolved. The practical situation in disputed areas changes before the agreed bilateral mechanisms have finished their work.
Thailand maintains that its measures are located within territory it considers sovereign, and that position deserves to be acknowledged. Yet a unilateral reading of territory cannot replace joint demarcation, and military control cannot establish lawful sovereignty.
The December 27 standard
The December 27 GBC joint statement sets a clear benchmark. Both governments agreed to maintain their existing troop deployments, avoid provocative actions, and refrain from building or expanding military infrastructure or fortifications beyond their own side. They also agreed to resume JBC surveying and demarcation as soon as possible.
These commitments should be honoured in both letter and spirit. Alleged violations should be examined through agreed verification mechanisms, including the ASEAN Observer Team.
A military presence does not confer territorial title. Razor wire cannot substitute for boundary demarcation, and the passage of time alone cannot turn a contested position into an internationally recognised border.
Peace includes the right to go home
Behind the diplomatic exchanges are families whose lives remain on hold.
On November 10, Pen Bona said more than 20,000 displaced Cambodians were still unable to return home. A separate Ministry of Interior update on November 4 put the broader number of people still displaced at roughly 24,000. That second figure is a wider measure, covering a larger group than the first.