Beyond the Ceasefire: Reported Violations of the Kuala Lumpur Accord and the Limits of Physical Control
One year after the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, reports of continued displacement and military construction in disputed border areas test whether Cambodia and Thailand are truly carrying out their peace commitments. Physical control on the ground, the article argues, cannot replace a lawful and negotiated boundary settlement.
A ceasefire can silence the guns, but it does not settle who owns the land. One year after the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, the real test for Cambodia and Thailand is no longer whether they have pledged peace, but whether those pledges are being carried out on the ground. Good intentions in a joint statement cannot guarantee that displaced families can safely go home.
For Cambodia, reports of continuing displacement in border communities and allegations of military construction in disputed areas raise serious doubts about what the peace process is delivering. These claims deserve close examination, but they should not be treated as proven facts simply because they have been made. Agreements between states must be judged by how well they are put into practice.
The aim should not be to stoke nationalist feeling or prejudge territorial claims. It should be to establish what has actually happened, honour the commitments both sides made, protect civilians, and make sure neither country treats a temporary military advantage as a substitute for a lawful, negotiated settlement.
What Was Promised
The Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, signed on October 26, 2025, reaffirmed both countries' commitments to settle disputes peacefully, respect international law and established boundaries, and carry out agreed de-escalation measures. It also acknowledged the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) and the existing bilateral channels for handling border issues.
The Joint Statement of the Third Special General Border Committee (GBC), signed on December 27, 2025, set out more concrete obligations. Both sides agreed to keep troops where they were deployed without further movement, to resume survey and demarcation work through the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC), and to allow displaced civilians to return safely, without obstruction, and with dignity. They also pledged to avoid provocative acts and to refrain from building or expanding military infrastructure or fortifications beyond their own territory.
These provisions matter because peace is more than the simple absence of fighting. It requires restraint, predictability, respect for agreed procedures, and practical steps that allow ordinary life to resume.
The central legal question, then, is whether conduct reported since the ceasefire fits with the commitments both governments accepted. Answering it requires evidence and reference to the relevant agreements, not political rhetoric alone.
Displacement and Unresolved Allegations
The humanitarian toll is deeply troubling.
On September 17, 2026, Cambodia's Ministry of National Defence said that 3,318 families, or 13,259 people, in Banteay Meanchey province were still unable to return home. The ministry blamed the situation on widespread damage from bombing, airstrikes and artillery fire, as well as what it described as occupation by Thai military forces.
On October 7, 2026, Cambodian authorities reported that 1,114 civilians from 357 families remained unable to return to their homes in the An Ses area of Preah Vihear province. According to the ministry, Thai personnel had placed shipping containers, strung barbed wire, dug trenches and built fortifications, and had also damaged houses, infrastructure and private property.
These are serious accusations made by Cambodian authorities, and they should be presented as such. The reports do not, on their own, amount to an independent finding on every incident, its exact location or its legal character. Even so, the scale of ongoing displacement calls for a substantive response and credible verification.
Each figure represents families who have lost their homes, livelihoods, schooling and sense of safety. Their right to return should not be treated as a secondary matter to be addressed only once diplomatic relations improve. Safe and voluntary return is itself a key measure of whether peace is taking hold.
Both governments should allow impartial verification, protect civilians and publish reliable information about the affected areas. Where a breach is established, the party responsible should take appropriate corrective measures.
Military Infrastructure Does Not Create Legal Title
The reported containers, trenches, barbed wire and fortifications raise a basic point: physical control alone does not establish lawful territorial title.
A military position can demonstrate effective presence on the ground, but it does not automatically fix the international boundary or resolve competing legal claims. Territorial questions must be decided under the applicable treaties, boundary instruments, maps, archival records, relevant historical evidence and principles of international law.
Cambodia and Thailand already have a framework for these questions, including the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of Land Boundary. It provides for joint technical work and peaceful consultation, and the December 2025 GBC Joint Statement directs the two countries to resume survey and demarcation through the JBC at the earliest opportunity.
At the same time, not every physical change on the ground is automatically a legal violation. The location of the activity, the status of the area, the governing agreement and the available evidence all matter.
Where military infrastructure is established or reinforced in territory belonging to the other state, or in ways that conflict with agreed restraint, the issue cannot be brushed aside simply because the structures now exist. Nor should the passage of time or the building of additional fortifications be allowed to stand in for a lawful boundary settlement.
The governing principle must be that territorial claims are resolved through law and agreed procedures, not through unilateral faits accomplis.
The JBC as a Test of Real Progress
Resuming the JBC is among the clearest practical steps open to both governments. It is not a symbolic concession from either side. It is the bilateral mechanism designed to carry out the technical work needed to clarify and demarcate the boundary.
Thailand has raised concerns about the security conditions needed for effective JBC work, including landmine risks and threats in border areas. These concerns deserve serious attention. Survey teams must be able to work safely, and humanitarian demining must be coordinated properly with technical boundary work.
Security concerns, however, should lead to practical arrangements rather than open-ended delay. The two sides can identify priority areas, agree on safety protocols, coordinate demining where necessary and set a transparent timetable for technical work.
The JBC will not, by itself, resolve every question of sovereignty, military conduct or civilian return. Its value lies in reducing uncertainty and offering a structured way to address boundary questions. A clearly surveyed and demarcated boundary can help both countries prevent future disputes and assess later allegations of incursion against a more reliable geographic reference.
Progress should be judged by concrete results: meetings held, technical work resumed, priority areas agreed and verifiable steps taken to lower tensions. Neither government should use the JBC as a public-relations tool while the practical process remains stalled.